TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/072291/0722101.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.8 KB | 116 lines

                                                                                NATION, Page 16

DESERT STORM AFTERMATH

Can Bush Keep Saddam from Building An Atom Bomb?


Short of sending the bombers back, the President has few options
as the last U.S. troops withdraw from Iraq

By MICHAEL DUFFY/WASHINGTON -- With reporting by William Mader/
London and J.F.O. McAllister/Washington


    Just six months ago, it was hard to imagine anything much
worse than the prospect of Saddam Hussein and his million-man
army in control of Kuwait and one-fifth of the world's oil
reserves. But an even more frightening specter has since
emerged: a wounded and vengeful Saddam with a smaller army whose
best punch is an atom bomb.

    This latest nightmare turns out to be dangerously close to
reality. Last week, after the U.S. threatened to bomb suspected
weapons-manufacturing installations, Iraqi officials admitted
that they are much closer to joining the nuclear club than was
previously known. In a 29-page report to the U.N. and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq revealed that it had
more than 4 lbs. of enriched uranium, developed from three
clandestine nuclear programs. The report, a masterpiece of
submission and arrogance, made no attempt to justify the illegal
program: "Iraq had sound reasons of national security which
induced it not to declare certain components of the program."

    Though gratified by the sudden openness, Western officials
were stunned by the breadth of the Iraqi enrichment effort, and
suspected that Saddam's disclosure only hinted at his actual
nuclear capability. Indeed, the intelligence failure is almost
as frightening as the prospect of Saddam's bomb. After Israeli
jets destroyed Iraq's Osirak research reactor in 1981, Baghdad
embarked headlong on a secret enrichment program that relied on
an old-fashioned method called electromagnetic isotope
separation. Used by Manhattan Project scientists in the 1940s,
the technology is considered so obsolete that it is discussed
openly in scientific literature and can be built from relatively
common electrical components. Though time consuming and
unreliable, it nonetheless fooled American intelligence
officials, who scoured the Iraqi desert with satellites for
signs of more modern enrichment plants. Without the help of an
Iraqi defector who turned up unannounced at American lines in
northern Iraq last March, the U.S. would still be
underestimating Saddam's nuclear potential.

    The latest evidence has left American and British
officials uncertain about the exact size of Iraq's weapons-grade
uranium stockpile. In theory, had Saddam's physicists proceeded
unimpeded from 1985 to 1995, Iraq might have been able to amass
anywhere from 200 lbs. to 1,100 lbs. of bomb-ready fuel, experts
say. At present, the amount of fissionable uranium is probably
still very small. "I'd be skeptical of claims that he's close
to a bomb," said an Administration official. "People who come
out with bold statements about how much material he has just
don't know what they're talking about."

    That still leaves the anti-Saddam alliance in a quandary.
Although U.N. Resolution 687 gives inspectors the authority to
find and remove from Iraq all chemical, biological and nuclear
material and equipment, enforcing the ban is a delicate job.
Backed by Britain, Bush has been brandishing his sword largely
to spook Saddam into cooperating with the U.N. inspection teams
-- a strategy that has yielded only mixed results so far.

    Though the last American troops began pulling out of
northern Iraq last week, the U.S. still has sufficient numbers
of bombers in the region to strike at nuclear facilities.
Pentagon officials carefully leaked word last week that they
were examining as many as "100 targets" inside Iraq for future
air strikes. But that kind of talk only illustrates Bush's
problem. The alleged 4 lbs. of enriched uranium occupies a space
about the size of a golf ball. The 30 to 38 electromagnetic
separators can be shuttled on flatbed trucks, just like the
elusive Scud missiles. Intelligence reports last week revealed
that Saddam's troops were burying equipment in the sand. Any
attack now would only be partially successful at best and, U.S.
officials fear, might lead Saddam to retaliate against Israel
or the Kurds. As Bush admitted, it's hard to "certify" the
locations "when you're burying component parts off in the desert
somewhere, in somebody's attic or somebody's basement in
downtown Baghdad."

    Such obstacles help explain why Bush went out of his way
last week to plead with Iraqi military leaders to overthrow
their boss. Going well beyond his previous statements, Bush
declared, "Our argument is not with the people of Iraq. It's not
even with other leaders in Iraq. We'd be perfectly willing to
give the military another chance, provided Saddam was out of
there." Explained a Bush aide later: "That was very blatant. We
don't care if the military takes over. It's Saddam we want."

    But the same official admits that the prospects of a coup
remain low. According to intelligence reports, Saddam has
executed 14 senior military officers in the past four weeks,
possibly in response to an attempted coup. For now, though he
is defeated militarily and surrounded on nearly all sides by
enemies, Saddam is playing a skillful game. "It's quite a
brilliant strategy," says Leonard S. Spector, a Carnegie
Endowment proliferation expert. Saddam is "stubborn, steadfast,
holding as much stuff back as possible and giving us enough to
defuse a possible attack." Such deft maneuvering means Bush has
a far larger problem on his hands than anyone imagined after
Iraq's defeat on Feb. 27. Until the nuclear menace is removed,
Bush's yearlong nightmare will not end.